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Prisoner’s Dilemma and Cooperation 
Daniel Smith 
Bristol Medical School: Population Health Sciences, University of Bristol, Bristol, UK 
 
Synonyms: Evolutionary game theory; Strategies for successful cooperation; 
Evolution of cooperation; Social dilemma. 
 
Brief definition 
The Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) is a two-player game where there is a conflict between 
individual and group interests. Overall, both players do better if they both cooperate, 
yet each individual player does better if they defect. However, if both players defect 
then they do worse than if they both cooperate, hence the dilemma. This deceptively 
simple game has been used extensively to explore the conditions under which 
cooperation can evolve. 
 
Introduction 
The widespread evidence for cooperation in the natural world is often seen as an 
evolutionary puzzle. This is because, all else being equal, it is fitness-enhancing to 
reap the rewards of others’ cooperation without paying any of the costs. In a group of 
cooperators who freely help anyone else, selfish strategies possess increased 
fitness relative to cooperative strategies, and consequently spread through the 
population until only selfish types remain (West, Griffin, & Gardner, 2007). The 
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tragedy of this scenario is that all individuals would be better off (i.e., have greater 
absolute fitness) if everyone cooperated (Rand & Nowak, 2013). However, natural 
selection is inherently myopic and only concerned with immediate relative fitness 
differences between phenotypes, hence this rather pessimistic conclusion. Nice 
guys, it would appear, do indeed finish last. 
However, cooperation is widespread throughout the biological world, from aphids 
and bacteria to yeast and zebra finches. Meerkats teach young group-mates to hunt 
and handle prey by deweaponizing otherwise dangerous scorpions; bees will 
aggressively defend threats to their nest even if they sacrifice their own lives in the 
process; and slime moulds, which are otherwise solitary, build communal structures 
when times are tough where only some individuals get the opportunity to spore and 
reproduce. Closer to home, our bodies are composed of highly-cooperative agents, 
with all our somatic cells facing no prospect of reproduction in order to pass on the 
germ-line. Even genomes and chromosomes can be thought of as collectives of 
cooperative individual genes.  
Human beings are cooperative creatures par excellence, working together to build 
societies, engage in warfare (even at a high risk of mortality) and help strangers in 
need. We even extend this cooperation across the species barrier, by looking after 
pets who appear to give very little back in return. Even invisible deities or abstract 
ideological concepts frequently receive our cooperation. Given the ubiquity of 
cooperation, there must be some solution to the rather bleak conclusion that all life is 
destined towards selfishness. Without cooperation, the genes of our distant 
ancestors would not have collaborated, complex life would not have evolved, and the 
biological world would solely consist of short, microscopic, strands of DNA. Of 
course, we should not be misled into viewing the widespread cooperation in nature 
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through rose-tinted spectacles; exploitation is also rife in nature, with organisms 
frequently willing to manipulate, cheat or deceive others, and this aspect of behavior 
should not be overlooked. Given this, the widespread cooperation we observe in the 
biological world must have evolved because these cooperative strategies 
outcompeted their less-cooperative counterparts. Using the framework of the 
Prisoner’s Dilemma, several such solutions will be discussed below. 
First, the term ‘cooperation’ needs to be defined, as different authors often have 
different definitions of what constitutes ‘cooperation’ (and associated terms such as 
‘altruism’). Here, cooperation is defined as “a behaviour that provides a benefit to 
another individual (recipient), and the evolution of which has been dependent on its 
beneficial effect for the recipient” (West, Griffin, & Gardner, 2007, p. 662). This 
includes behaviors which are both 'mutually beneficial' (i.e., both the actor and 
recipient benefit from cooperation) and 'altruistic’ (i.e., the recipient benefits but the 
actor pays a cost). These 'costs' and 'benefits' are measured in terms of individual 
fitness, rather than short-term gains and losses (e.g., resources), meaning that 
behavior which is costly in the short-term yet fitness-enhancing in the long-term (e.g., 
reciprocity; see below) would be classed as mutually beneficial, rather than altruistic.  
This definition also includes the important proviso that said behavior must have 
'evolved to benefit others', meaning that behavior which helps others as a by-product 
of otherwise self-interested behavior does not count as cooperation. For instance, 
imagine a scenario where a group of four organisms are being attacked; if none of 
the group retaliate, then the whole group perishes, while each individual who does 
retaliate increases their own probability of dying by 10%, while increasing the 
probability of group survival by 25% (Clutton-Brock, 2009). In this scenario the best 
strategy is for individuals to retaliate, regardless of the actions of others, as the costs 
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to retaliation (a 10% increase in mortality risk) are outweighed by the benefits (a 25% 
decrease in mortality risk). Thus, even though this retaliatory behavior may seem 
cooperative as it increases the survival of other group members, the benefits derived 
by others are an incidental by-product of otherwise self-interested behavior, so this 
should not be categorized as ‘cooperation’. 
 
The Prisoner’s Dilemma 
The Prisoner’s Dilemma (hereafter PD) is one of the most commonly-used tools to 
explore the evolution of cooperation. The PD is an outgrowth of ‘game theory’, a 
branch of mathematics originated by John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern 
designed to analyze the best strategies when interacting with others, given different 
conditions. In its simplest one-shot version, the PD formalizes the scenario outlined 
above, where cooperation should not evolve. There are two players in the PD, both 
of which have to decide whether to cooperate or to defect. On average, both players 
do better if they both cooperate, yet there is always the incentive to defect as the 
fitness pay-offs are greater. Yet if both defect, both players earn less than if they 
both cooperated. These situations are known as ‘social dilemmas’ (Rand & Nowak, 
2013), which pit individual and group interests against one another. The PD is by far 
the most common of these social dilemmas, but others are also possible (see 
below). 
The canonical example of the PD (and where it gets its name) concerns two 
prisoners in the following scenario. Two suspected criminals are brought in for 
questioning regarding a serious crime and taken to separate rooms. The police have 
enough evidence to convict them of a minor crime, but not enough for conviction of a 
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serious crime. Each prisoner is then offered a bargain and can either cooperate with 
the other prisoner (keep quiet) or defect (testify that the other prisoner committed the 
serious crime). The outcomes of these actions depend on the behavior of the other 
player. If both cooperate and keep quiet, then each gets charged with the minor 
offence and serves one year in jail. If one cooperates and the other defects, then the 
defector walks away free while the cooperator spends ten years in jail for the serious 
crime. While if they both defect then they both get five years in prison. These 
sentences (or pay-offs) are displayed in figure 1. 
In this scenario, defection is the only rational decision. Even though mutual 
cooperation results in the highest average payoff for both prisoners (one year in jail), 
there is always the temptation to defect if your partner cooperates, as then you 
would not spend any time in prison. Cooperation is therefore a risky decision 
because if you cooperate but your partner defects, then you spend ten years in 
prison. Consequently, regardless of the behavior of your partner, defection is the 
only rational option: if your partner cooperates, you can do better by defecting; while 






Figure 1: A pay-off matrix for the Prisoner’s Dilemma. The behaviors at the 
top and the side of the matrix reflect the behavioral decisions made by each 
player (either cooperate of defect). Each cell represents the number of years 
spent in prison. The pay-offs for player A are shown in the top right of each 
cell (above the diagonal), while the pay-offs for player B are shown in the 
bottom left (below the diagonal). For each prisoner, regardless of how their 
partner acts, the highest pay-off is to defect, even though mutually 
cooperation is superior to mutual defection. 
 
For generality, these outcomes can be displayed in an abstract pay-off matrix (figure 
2A). There are four possible outcomes: Reward (R), where both parties cooperate; 
Temptation (T), where there is the temptation to defect on a cooperating partner; 
Punishment (P), where both parties defect; and the Sucker’s pay-off (S), where an 
individual cooperates but their partner defects. These outcomes can be ranked 
according to their pay-offs: T>R>P>S. This ordering of outcomes defines the PD 
scenario (other orderings of pay-offs are discussed below). In addition, for a PD 
scenario two Rewards must be greater than a Temptation plus a Sucker’s pay-off 
(2*R>T+S), otherwise in iterated games repeated turn-taking of Temptation then 
Sucker’s pay-offs would lead to greater pay-offs than repeated mutual cooperation. 
The ‘classic’ pay-offs for these outcomes are T=5, R=3, P=1 and S=0 (figure 2B). 
This formalizes the conclusion above that, regardless of the behavior of your partner, 
it is in your best interests to defect (as T>R and P>S). As the same holds for the 
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other player, they should also defect, regardless of the behavior of the first partner. 
In this one-shot situation, defection is an ‘evolutionary stable strategy’ (ESS; 
Maynard Smith, 1982), in that no other strategy can invade a population of defectors. 
 
Figure 2: Pay-off matrices of the Prisoner’s Dilemma. The pay-offs for player 
A are shown in the top right of each cell (above the diagonal), while the pay-
offs for player B are shown in the bottom left (below the diagonal). A) This 
matrix displays the abstract pay-off structure in a Prisoner’s Dilemma. 
R=Reward (mutual cooperation); T=Temptation (defecting on a cooperative 
partner); S=Sucker’s pay-off (cooperating on a partner’s defection) and; 
P=Punishment (mutual defection). The ranking of these outcomes for a 
Prisoner’s Dilemma (from best to worst in terms of pay-offs) are: T>R>P>S. B) 
This matrix displays the ‘classic’ pay-offs applied in a Prisoner’s Dilemma. 
These pay-offs were used in Robert Axelrod’s tournament.  
 
This situation seems to fit many of our intuitions regarding the fragility of cooperation 
and the benefits of reaping the rewards of others’ cooperation. Take food-sharing 
among hunter-gatherers; it is always better to be the one who receives food without 
paying the costs of foraging (in terms of time, energy or risk of injury), even if this 
reduces the overall amount of resources brought back into camp. Or take trench 
warfare during World War I; it is always better to attack first (defect), rather than 
abstain (cooperate), as the enemy might attack first, even if this increases the risk of 
mortality for both sides.  
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The PD can also be extended to an n-person game – the ‘tragedy of the commons’ – 
where the same conclusion holds. To use an agricultural example, if farmers have 
cattle which graze on a plot of land, it would be optimal in the long-run for individuals 
to only allow the cattle to graze as much as can be grown back (cooperate). This 
would mean that resources remain stable over time, sustaining the long-term future 
of the population. However, if one farmer purchases more cattle and allows them to 
graze on the land (defect), their short-term material pay-off will be higher than the 
other farmers. Therefore, other farmers must also obtain extra cattle in order to 
compete, causing the resources of the pasture to deplete past sustainable levels. 
Real-world illustrations of this ‘tragedy of the commons’ abound: over-exploitation of 
natural resources, man-made climate change and tax avoidance are all obvious 
examples where short-term individual gain can have damaging long-term population-
level consequences. As can be seen from these handful of examples, the Prisoner’s 
Dilemma can be an incredibly useful tool for modelling myriad different social 
dilemmas which pit individual and group interests against one another. 
To summarize, in one-shot games defection is always the best strategy, which is 
why the evolution of cooperation is often seen as a puzzle. However, given that 
cooperation is widespread in the natural world, especially among humans, there 
must be solutions to this rather pessimistic conclusion. In particular, note that the 
main conclusion of the PD only holds under rather special circumstances: i) partners 
will never meet again; ii) partners are not related; and iii) partners interact randomly 
with others in the population (i.e., individuals cannot choose their partners). If these 
conditions are not met, then cooperation can evolve, despite the short-term benefits 




Solution 1 – Repeated interactions 
In a PD scenario, defection is the only optimal strategy if interactions are not 
repeated (and players are not related and cannot choose their partners; see 
solutions 2 and 3, below). Clearly, however, in iterated games the long-term pay-offs 
to cooperation are greater than the short-term benefits of defection. Imagine a PD 
with the pay-off structure in figure 2B, repeated for 10 rounds with the same 
partners. Now consider two sequences, X and Y. In sequence X, Player A 
cooperates first, while Player B defects; player A therefore receives 0 points, while 
player B receives 5. In sequence Y, both players cooperate, so both receive 3 points. 
So far, it appears that defectors have greater fitness. However, in sequence X Player 
A now defects (as does player B), so from rounds 2 to 10 each player only receives 
1 point per round. For sequence Y, in contrast, both players continually cooperate, 
so earn 3 points per round. Both players in sequence Y earn 30 points, while in 
sequence X player A receives a total of 9 points, while player B receives a total of 
14. Therefore, if the PD is iterated, cooperators can have higher fitness than 
defectors. 
However, in a finitely repeated PD there is a problem. If players know that the game 
will only last 10 rounds, then they have an incentive to defect on the last round, 
thereby increasing their overall pay-offs without harming their future interactions with 
the other player (because there are none). The other player of course also realizes 
this, so both players are likely to defect on the tenth round. This effectively means 
that the ninth round of the game becomes the ‘final’ round, as players will expect 
their partner to defect on the tenth round, which encourages both players to defect in 
this preceding round. This vicious cycle repeats back until the first round, in which 
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case the game simply returns to a one-shot PD and the only rational choice is to 
defect (Axelrod, 1984).  
Repeated interactions may not therefore solve the problem of cooperation unless the 
game is repeated for an unknown length of time (although note that experimental 
work has shown that even in finitely repeated games levels of cooperation are 
sustained for longer than theoretically expected, although defection does increase as 
the known end-point approaches; Selten & Stoecker, 1986). If players do not know 
when the final round will be then the above issue does not arise. In this situation, 
players do not know with certainty when the final round will be, removing the 
temptation to defect on the final round, therefore increasing overall levels of 
cooperation as long as the probability of repeated interactions is sufficiently high. 
This corresponds to the common-sense notion that it is better to cooperate with 
someone if you plan to meet them repeatedly in the future, compared to someone 
you probably will not meet again. 
A test of these predictions was formalized in Robert Axelrod’s infamous tournament 
competition, in which various strategies were pitted against one another in an 
iterated PD game (Axelrod, 1984). There were two versions of this tournament. In 
the first version, 14 game theorists from fields of economics, psychology, political 
science, mathematics and sociology submitted strategies which were paired against 
one another for five games of exactly 200 moves each (with the pay-offs in figure 
2B). After this first tournament, a second tournament was staged, which received 62 
entries from six countries. In this second tournament each strategy was paired for 
five games of varying length, with an average of 151 moves per game. Example 
strategies submitted to these tournaments include: 
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- RANDOM: This program randomly cooperates and defects with equal 
frequency. 
- GRIM: This strategy cooperates until the other player defects, after which 
GRIM is unforgiving and always defects until the end of the game. 
- TFT (tit-for-tat): This program simply begins with ‘cooperate’, then repeats 
the previous move of its partner (i.e., if its partner defects, TFT will defect 
on the next round, while if its partner cooperates, so will TFT in the next 
round). 
- JOSS: Similar to TFT, but instead of always cooperating when the other 
player cooperates, 10% of the time JOSS will defect after its partner’s 
cooperation. 
- TFTT (tit-for-two-tats): This strategy is equivalent to TFT, but rather than 
defecting after every partner’s defection, it will only defect once its partner 
has defected twice in succession. 
- TRANQUILIZER: This rule attempts to build up mutually beneficial 
cooperative relationships with its partner, while also defecting if its partner 
defects too often. If a cooperative relationship is established, however, 
TRANQUILIZER attempts an occasional defection to try and exploit its 
partner, hoping that the partner will forgive the infrequent transgression. If 
the partner does not retaliate these defections, then the frequency of 
defections increases. 
In both of these tournaments, rather surprisingly the simplest program came out on 
top: tit-for-tat (TFT). This strategy received the highest overall score in both 
tournaments and was shown to be robust in additional analyses against different 
compositions of other strategies. Additionally, in an iterated evolutionary simulation, 
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where the strategies with the highest score in each generation produced more 
offspring in the next generation, TFT again out-performed all other strategies and left 
the most descendants. That is, TFT did well against all manner of opponents, under 
a wide range of parameters. TFT was able to succeed against other cooperative 
strategies by reciprocating in kind, while at the same time was effective against 
‘nasty’ strategies as it could not be exploited easily (any defections were met by an 
immediate defection by TFT). More complex strategies which tried to exploit others 
were less successful as their defections were likely to set off chains of mutual 
punishment and defection.  
In this iterated PD scenario TFT was found to be an ESS, in that it is able to resist 
invasion from any other strategy, provided the PD is repeated enough times. This is 
because no other strategy can receive a greater pay-off – and therefore greater 
fitness – than TFT in an iterated PD (for additional details and formal proofs, see 
Axelrod, 1984 and Maynard Smith, 1982). The pay-off of TFT against itself is 
repeated mutual cooperation. The pay-off of TFT against any other cooperative 
strategy will also be sustained mutual cooperation (i.e., CCCC), so this strategy 
cannot have higher fitness than TFT, so cannot invade. The pay-off of TFT against 
an alternating strategy (e.g., DCDC) will always be lower than mutual cooperation 
(as T+S< 2*R), so this strategy cannot invade TFT. Similarly, a strategy of mutual 
defection (i.e., DDDD) will also have a lower pay-off than mutual cooperation, so also 
cannot invade. However, it is important to note that other cooperative strategies can 
do equally as well as TFT, and this point will be returned to below.  
Given the success of this simple TFT strategy, from this tournament Axelrod devised 
four ‘guidelines’ characteristic of successful strategies which are likely to be 
important in order to promote cooperation: 
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- Be nice: Never be the first to defect. Of the 15 highest-ranked strategies, 
all bar one was ‘nice’, in that they were never the first to defect (the 
highest-ranked ‘nasty’ strategy finished eighth). Of the bottom-ranking 15 
strategies, all were nasty. 
- Reciprocate both cooperation and defection: That is, be both retaliatory 
and forgiving. It is important to be retaliatory so that other strategies do not 
exploit you. TFT does this well by punishing any defectors immediately. At 
the same time, it pays to be forgiving. If another player defects but then 
tries to cooperate afterwards, it is better to forgive them and cooperate in 
the future rather than risk repeated mutual defection. It is this quality that 
enabled TFT to perform better in the tournament than GRIM (which never 
forgave an initial defection by its partner). 
- Don’t be envious: Successful cooperation is not about obtaining a higher 
score than your opponent. A striking (although obvious, given some 
thought) fact is that TFT never beat any of its opponents; the best it could 
do was to draw (i.e., mutual cooperation), but in the process both partners 
could accrue a high score. Strategies which tried to beat their opponents 
were more likely to end up in cycles of defection and consequently earn 
lower scores. 
- Be clear: Don’t be too clever. TFT is a simple strategy to understand, while 
more complex programs are difficult to figure out and therefore predict 
their behavior (such as TRANQUILIZER). For cooperation to be sustained, 
clarity is key. 
This tournament highlights that importance of reciprocity and repeated interactions 
for the evolution of cooperation, supporting the conclusions presented a decade 
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earlier by Robert Trivers (1971). However, despite the success of TFT it is not an 
ESS under all circumstances. Firstly, in a population of ALLD (always defect), a lone 
TFT cannot succeed as there are no other cooperative strategies to interact with. 
Therefore, assuming that the mutation rate is not too high and that cooperative 
strategies enter the population one at a time, defectors will always have higher 
fitness (Axelrod, 1984). As a concrete example, given five rounds of an iterated PD, 
a solitary TFT will only earn four points (TFT is a sucker once, then defects), while its 
ALLD partner will earn nine points. All other ALLD strategies in the population which 
only play against one another earn five points each. ALLD is therefore also an ESS, 
although TFT has a much wider basin of attraction once cooperative strategies have 
gained a foothold in the population. TFT therefore has trouble explaining the initial 
evolution of cooperation from a non-cooperative population, but it can explain its 
maintenance and spread once cooperation has crossed a certain threshold. 
However, from a population of defectors cooperation can evolve if two cooperative 
strategies emerge at the same time and preferentially cooperate with one another 
(cooperative assortment; see solution 3, below), or if the two players are related (kin 
selection; see solution 2, below).  
Secondly, if there is ‘noise’ in the model, either in terms of mutation and drift or 
mistakes by other players (e.g., a cooperative strategy may accidentally defect) then 
TFT is not necessarily an ESS. In a population of TFT, the pay-offs for TFT and 
other cooperative strategies are equivalent, meaning that given some mutation rate 
other strategies can invade by genetic drift (Nowak & Sigmund, 1993). For instance, 
if ALLC (always cooperate) invades a population of TFT by drift, this will then trigger 
further evolutionary dynamics as ‘nasty’ strategies can exploit ALLC. Additionally, 
Axelrod’s tournament is predicated on the assumption that strategies never make 
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mistakes. This is clearly not the case in the real-world as organisms may misinterpret 
or forget the behavior of their partner and subsequently defect when they should 
have cooperated. Indeed, after Axelrod’s tournament it was found that TFT may not 
be the ‘best’ strategy, as PAVLOV (or, ‘win-stay, lose-shift’) was found to do better 
than TFT if mutation and occasional mistakes were included in the model. PAVLOV 
simply repeats its own previous behavior if it wins (R or T pay-offs), while shifts to 
the alternative strategy if it loses (P or S pay-offs). PAVLOV’s success over TFT can 
be attributed to two factors. Firstly, it can exploit unconditional cooperators, while 
TFT only engages in mutual cooperation with these partners. This means that 
PAVLOV cannot be invaded by unconditionally cooperative strategies due to drift, 
unlike TFT. Secondly, PAVLOV can correct occasional mistakes, while for TFT any 
defection – even accidental – can result in repeated bouts of retaliation. There is 
therefore no single ‘best’ rule in an iterated PD, independent of the environment of 
other strategies, but rules such as TFT and PAVLOV do appear to be robust under a 
wide range of conditions. 
Thirdly, these conclusions only hold in a simultaneous PD game, where both players 
make their decisions at the same time. While this situation may correspond to some 
types of cooperative behavior, other situations may reflect an ‘alternating’ PD, where 
individuals take it in turn to decide whether to cooperate or not (Nowak & Sigmund, 
1994). For instance, bird parents often take turns obtaining food for their young, 
bouts of animal grooming are generally alternating, as are food-sharing situations in 
human and non-human animals. TFT may not be the best strategy in these 
scenarios, especially if reciprocation is not immediate and there are disparities in 
need. Need is important as the value of receiving cooperation is greater for those in 
need compared to those with an abundance of resources (Trivers, 1971). Take a 
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monetary example; $1,000 is more valuable to a person in poverty than to a 
millionaire. Similarly, the costs to sharing are greater for individuals in need 
compared to individuals with lots of resources. Using the $1,000 example again, the 
cost of sharing this amount is obviously greater to the person in poverty compared to 
the millionaire. Many PD scenarios assume that the pay-offs are equivalent between 
the two players, yet these value asymmetries greatly change the cooperative 
dynamics, making cooperation more likely to evolve (Trivers, 1971). For instance, in 
hunter-gatherer societies a small number of highly-productive individuals tend to 
provision others much more than they receive in return. Although this behavior 
appears altruistic, the costs to sharing these resources are low, relative to the 
benefits to the needy individuals receiving the food. Importantly, when the tables are 
turned and these productive cooperative individuals find themselves in need, due to 
illness or injury, they are more likely to receive resources than less-productive 
foragers (Gurven, Allen-Arave, Hill, & Hurtado, 2000). Similarly, among the Agta, a 
Filipino hunter-gatherer population, individuals in need were both less likely to share 
resources (D. Smith et al., 2016) and more likely to receive resources from others 
(D. Smith et al., 2018). Such need-based sharing may reflect reciprocal cooperation, 
but in circumstances beyond those modelled by simultaneous PD games such as 
Axelrod’s tournament. 
Nonetheless, despite these caveats regarding TFT, the basic conclusion that 
reciprocity and nice strategies can facilitate the evolution of cooperation has been 
repeatedly supported, both theoretically (see above) and empirically. As a few 
additional case studies: repeated economic games in a lab are associated with 
greater levels of cooperation (Rand & Nowak, 2013); stable hunter-gatherer camps 
with a high probability of repeated interactions are more cooperative than camps with 
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a high turnover in membership (D. Smith et al., 2016) and; truces in trench warfare in 
World War I were more probable when troops were stationed opposite one another 
for longer lengths of time (Axelrod, 1984). 
 
Solution 2 – Kin selection 
The paradox of the PD can therefore be overcome by repeated reciprocal 
interactions. A further solution is through cooperating with those who you share 
genes with, meaning that by helping relatives you can indirectly pass on your own 
genes to future generations. Although evolutionary geneticists such as Sewell Wright 
and JBS Haldane had an intuitive understanding that shared ancestry was important 
in explaining cooperative behavior, this approach was formalized by William 
Hamilton (1964) with his theory of ‘inclusive fitness’, often referred to as ‘kin 
selection’. Hamilton demonstrated that genes for altruism could propagate through a 
population if these altruistic acts were directed towards genetic relatives. Thus, even 
though these altruistic acts harm the individual’s own fitness (known as their ‘direct 
fitness’), they can still evolve if it increases their inclusive fitness by increasing the 
fitness of their relatives (an individual’s ‘indirect fitness’).  
The likelihood of an altruistic trait spreading through the population depends on three 
factors: i) the benefit to the individual receiving the altruistic act (b), in terms of 
lifetime reproductive success; ii) the cost to the actor to performing said altruistic act 
(c), in terms of lifetime reproductive success, and; iii) the coefficient of relatedness 
between the actor and the recipient (r), in terms of the proportion of shared genes 
(e.g., 0.5 for parents/offspring/full siblings, 0.25 for aunts/uncles/nieces/nephews, 
0.125 for cousins, and so on). Altruism is therefore expected if the benefits to the 
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recipient of a cooperative act, as a function of relatedness, outweigh the cost of the 
action. This is known as Hamilton’s Rule, as is given by the simple formula: b*r>c. To 
take an abstract example, if the cost of an altruistic act is a one-unit reduction in 
reproductive success for the actor, but a three unit increase for the recipient, the 
actor is likely to cooperate if the recipient is a full sibling, but not a niece or nephew. 
This is because, for a full sibling, 3 (the benefit to the recipient) times 0.5 
(relatedness between siblings) is 1.5, which is larger than 1 (the cost to the actor), so 
the benefits outweigh the costs. For a niece or nephew, however, the benefit is 3 
times 0.25 (0.75), which is lower than the cost to the actor, so cooperation would not 
be expected to evolve in this instance.  
Kin selection is a powerful explanation for the existence of cooperation in nature, 
with much seemingly altruistic behavior explicable in terms of increasing an 
organisms inclusive fitness, even if it damages their direct fitness (West et al., 2007). 
Organisms caring for their siblings, self-sacrifice in eusocial insects, somatic cells 
working in service for the germ-line, and numerous other examples highlight the 
importance of kin selection in explaining cooperative behavior. Although it can be 
difficult to dissociate indirect and direct fitness benefits in humans – that is, we often 
reciprocally cooperate with our relatives (Rand & Nowak, 2013) – kin selection 
appears to be a powerful force shaping human affairs: kin-based nepotism is rife in 
human societies, including inheritance rules and regal succession; fictive kinship 
terms, such as ‘brother’ or ‘sister’, are applied to non-kin as a sign of friendship; 
while food-sharing among foragers is often targeted towards kin, even when 
controlling for reciprocal sharing (D. Smith et al., 2016). 
This kin selection approach can also be formalized in a PD situation. In traditional 
PD scenarios players are assumed to be unrelated to one another. This means that 
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there are no indirect fitness benefits to cooperating with your partner, as helping your 
partner does not increase your indirect fitness (r=0). In contrast, when playing 
against relatives these indirect fitness benefits need to be taken into consideration, 
as they can alter the subsequent pay-off structure (Maynard Smith, 1982). Given the 
traditional PD pay-offs presented in figure 2B (T=5; R=3; P=1; S=0), when adopting 
an inclusive fitness perspective the indirect fitness benefits accrued by your partner 
also need to be taken into consideration. Therefore, if both players cooperate (R), 
the inclusive fitness perspective needs to sum both the direct fitness benefits (a pay-
off of 3) and the indirect fitness benefits (a pay-off of 3 multiplied by the relatedness 
between players), meaning that the inclusive fitness pay-off is: R+(R*r). The same 
applies for mutual defection: P+(P*r). For a Sucker’s pay-off, the indirect effects of 
your partner’s Temptation pay-off needs to be considered, so: S+(T*r). While for a 
Temptation, the Sucker’s pay-off of your partners needs to be accounted for, so: 
T+(S*r).  
This is summarized in figure 3, using an example coefficient of relatedness of 0.5. 
Under this situation, although exploitation (T) is still preferable to mutual cooperation 
(R), being the sucker (S) is now superior to mutual defection (P). As mutual defection 
is now the worst-case scenario for both players, individuals are incentivized to 
cooperate. Although technically this is not a PD scenario anymore (but rather a 
different social dilemma known as a ‘snowdrift’ type game, see below), this example 
demonstrates how relatedness can promote cooperation, even in one-shot 
scenarios. All of this will, of course, vary by the coefficient of relatedness and the 
pay-off matrix. Cooperation will be less likely among more distant kin or unrelated 
individuals, while under different PD pay-off matrices (e.g., T=5; R=4; P=1; S=0) 




Figure 3: The inclusion of indirect fitness benefits changes pay-offs of the 
Prisoner’s Dilemma. The left matrix shows the formulas for constructing the 
Prisoner’s Dilemma pay-offs between relatives. If both players cooperate, 
then the inclusive fitness pay-off is an additive combination of both an 
individual’s direct fitness (R) and the other player’s pay-off multiplied by the 
relatedness coefficient (R*r). Given a value of r=0.5, the indirect fitness benefit 
to mutual cooperation is 1.5 (3*0.5), which gives a total inclusive fitness pay-
off of 4.5 (3+1.5). The right matrix displays the pay-offs for each of the 
Prisoner’s Dilemma outcomes given a value of r=0.5, using the pay-offs in 
figure 2B. Among close kin, an inclusive fitness approach changes the 
Prisoner’s Dilemma to a snowdrift scenario (see figure 5), where mutual 
defection is no longer an evolutionary stable strategy. For simplicity, only the 
pay-offs to Player A are displayed here. 
 
Solution 3 – Cooperative assortment 
The pessimistic conclusion of the PD also only holds in a well-mixed population, 
where cooperators cannot choose who they interact with. If, however, organisms can 
‘rig the game’ and only interact and cooperate with other cooperative organisms, 
then cooperation can evolve much more readily. The previous two solutions above 
can also be thought of as solving the dilemma via similar assortative processes; 
repeated cooperative interactions with the same individual, rather than interacting 
randomly with the population (reciprocity; solution 1) and interacting with close kin, 
as opposed to non-relatives (kin selection; solution 2). At a fundamental level, 
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cooperation can evolve if there is positive assortment in cooperative phenotypes; in 
the words of William Hamilton “kinship should be considered just one way of getting 
positive regression of genotype in the recipient, and that it is this positive regression 
that is vitally necessary for altruism. … it obviously makes no difference if altruists 
settle with altruists because they are related (perhaps never having parted from 
them) or because they recognize fellow altruists as such, or settle together because 
of some pleiotropic effect of the gene on habitat preference” (Hamilton, 1975, p. 
337). Thus, all theories for the evolution of cooperation are predicated on the 
principle of assortment.  
However, while reciprocity and kin selection are theories of assortativity, they are not 
theories of cooperative assortativity as they do not require organisms to cooperate 
with others based solely on their partner’s level of cooperativeness. As will be 
described below, theories of cooperative assortativity can help explain the otherwise 
seemingly inexplicable cooperation between non-relatives who may not interact 
again in the future. This type of cooperation is seen routinely in modern market-
based economies, including giving to charity, volunteering, purchasing goods and 
academic peer review. 
At its most basic level, cooperative assortment occurs when cooperative phenotypes 
preferentially interact with other cooperative phenotypes. This is easier said than 
done, however, as mechanisms to establish and maintain this cooperative 
assortment are required to keep defectors at bay. The concept of ‘partner choice’ is 
relevant here, especially when compared to so-called ‘partner control’ (Barclay, 
2013). Partner choice occurs when individuals can choose who to cooperate with (or 
to ‘walk away’ from non-cooperators), while under situations of partner control 
individuals cannot avoid non-cooperators, but rather have to control the effects their 
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partner’s selfish behavior. In a repeated PD scenario like Axelrod’s tournament, 
partners cannot choose each other, so strategies which limit exploitative partners by 
conditional cooperation and punishment, such as TFT, are necessary; this is an 
example of a ‘partner control’ situation. On the other hand, if individuals could 
choose their partners, or walk away from them when they wished, this would 
constitute a ‘partner choice’ situation. Therefore, if individuals can avoid 
uncooperative others, rather than having to control them, cooperation can evolve 
more readily, even in one-shot interactions (Rand & Nowak, 2013; Roberts, 2015). 
One method to promote this cooperative assortment is through the use of reputation. 
Indirect reciprocity is one such mechanism, which is based on the principle of 
‘helping those who help others’ (Nowak & Sigmund, 1998). If individuals acquire a 
reputation for cooperation by being cooperative, and this reputation is known by 
others, those with a reputation for cooperation are more likely to be cooperated with, 
irrespective of a lack of previous encounters. Theoretical models have indicated that 
cooperation can evolve via this process (Nowak & Sigmund, 1998), especially when 
combined with mechanisms of partner choice to avoid uncooperative individuals 
(Roberts, 2015). Results from several empirical studies (reviewed in Milinski, 2016) 
have found results consistent with indirect reciprocity. For example, non-cooperative 
individuals are less likely to be cooperated with in the future, while individuals also 
appear to engage in ‘reputation management’; if their behavior will be made public to 
others they are more likely to cooperate. Such behavior is particularly apparent in 
online marketplaces, such as eBay, where individuals who cultivate a reputation for 
outstanding customer service are more likely to attract new customers. 
A related theory based on reputation and cooperative assortment is ‘competitive 
altruism’ (also known as ‘reputation-based partner choice’; Sylwester & Roberts, 
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2013). According to this theory, individuals first signal their cooperativeness, after 
which these cooperative individuals are more likely to be chosen for mutually-
beneficial cooperative ventures. For instance, a forager may share their food widely 
with the camp in order to subsequently be chosen as a partner to share food with or 
to be chosen as a cooperative hunting partner. Although reputation-based partner 
choice and indirect reciprocity make similar predictions, such that seemingly costly 
displays of cooperation will be rewarded by cooperation in future encounters, the 
mechanisms are distinct. In reputation-based partner choice, individuals 
preferentially interact with cooperative individuals for future mutually-beneficial 
cooperative interactions with said cooperator. In contrast, indirect reciprocity 
assumes that individuals help cooperative others solely to enhance their own 
cooperative reputation so that others will cooperate with them, irrespective of future 
mutually-beneficial interactions with the same partner. Nonetheless, both are 
theories of cooperative assortment which can explain how one-shot cooperation 
among non-kin can evolve.  
Theories of cooperative assortment are likely to have great relevance in 
understanding cooperation in modern market-based economies where much 
cooperation is between unrelated individuals and interactions may not be repeated. 
Note, however, that these theories based on cooperative assortment may not 
necessarily predict patterns of cooperation in small-scale societies, where cues other 
than cooperativeness, such as relatedness of reciprocity, can be used to select 
partners. For instance, among Agta hunter-gatherers individuals were more likely to 
share with less cooperative camp-mates, potentially reflecting need-based sharing or 
the avoidance of being indebted to others. Instead, they were found to preferentially 
share with kin, reciprocal partners and those in need (D. Smith et al., 2018). 
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Solution 4 – Communication and coordination 
Communication and coordination between players does not change the logic of the 
PD in one-shot games. However, simply giving strangers 30 minutes to interact 
before playing a one-shot PD is enough for participants to predict how cooperative 
their partner would be (Frank, Gilovich, & Regan, 1993). This simple result highlights 
the importance of communication and coordination in shaping cooperative behavior. 
This is especially likely to be a factor in repeated games as individuals need to know 
that their partner will also cooperate. Unlike the ‘free-rider problem’, in iterated 
games there is a ‘problem of coordination’, as the issue is not necessarily that of 
free-riders having increased fitness relative to cooperators, but rather the difficulty in 
coordinating behavior for mutual benefit. In these situations, cooperation may be the 
best strategy for all parties, yet cooperation may not occur due to a lack of common 
knowledge over how others will behave.  
The iterated PD can be thought of as a coordination game; individuals do best in 
repeated cooperative interactions, but in order to reap this benefit they need to know 
that their partner will actually cooperate. These problems require ‘meta-knowledge’ 
to solve. Put another way, the important point is not whether an individual knows that 
cooperation is the best course of action, but whether said individual knows that their 
partner also knows that cooperation is the best course of action and will act 
accordingly. Communication is therefore necessary to solve these problems of 
coordination, and numerous studies have shown that simply allowing players to 
communicate can promote cooperation (reviewed in E. A. Smith, 2010).  
These coordination games can be modelled in an abstract pay-off structure (figure 
4), similar to the PD. In these scenarios, defection is not the optimal strategy, as the 
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highest pay-off in these games is achieved by partners coordinating their behavior 
(R). As a hypothetical example, imagine two hunter-gatherers have the option of 
either cooperating to hunt stag or foraging for berries by themselves (the equivalent 
of defecting in this scenario): If both individuals cooperate then they are likely to 
successfully hunt a stag, which is a big haul for both partners (a pay-off of 5 each); if 
both players decide to forage individually for berries, then both receive a lower 
amount of food (a pay-off of 1 each); however, if an individual decides to hunt stag 
and their partner decides to pick berries, then the berry-picker still receives some 
resources (a pay-off of 2), while the stag-hunter has no chance of a successful hunt 
by themselves, so receives a pay-off of 0. Therefore, in order to reap the rewards of 
cooperation individuals need to coordinate their behavior.   
 
Figure 4: An example of a coordination game pay-off matrix. Here, in order to 
reap the most rewards players need to coordinate their behavior. The pay-offs 
displayed here reflect a ‘stag-hunt’ scenario (see text) where the player who 
cooperates does worse than the one who defects (R>T>P>S), although other 
coordination games exist where any non-matching behavior is inferior to 
mutual defection, in which case R>P>T=S. The pay-offs for player A are 
shown in the top right of each cell (above the diagonal), while the pay-offs for 




One real-world example of such a coordination game involves foraging strategies 
among the Lamalera from Indonesia (Alvard & Nolin, 2002). In this society 
individuals can either fish individually or collectively hunt whale (which has a greater 
pay-off than solitary fishing). In order to coordinate behavior and ensure that 
cooperation (collective whale hunting) is profitable for all involved, complex sets of 
social norms exist among the Lamalerans, including specific rules over distributing 
whale meat. These social norms ensure that all Lamalerans are aware of the ‘rules 
of the game’, thereby coordinating their behavior for mutual benefit. While language 
obviously serves this purpose of coordinating social behavior (E. A. Smith, 2010), 
storytelling may be another such mechanism to broadcast this meta-knowledge, 
therefore promoting cooperation (D. Smith et al., 2017). A large proportion of stories 
told in hunter-gatherer societies appear to concern social behavior, particularly 
regarding extolling the virtues of prosocial behavior (such as cooperation and 
equality) and the punishment meted-out to norm violators (such as selfish or lazy 
individuals). These stories also appear to enhance cooperation, as among the Agta 
(a Filipino hunter-gatherer population mentioned earlier) higher levels of cooperation 
in an experimental game were associated with a greater proportion of skilled 
storytellers in camp. Thus, the importance of mechanisms to coordinate behavior for 
mutual benefit should not be overlooked when exploring the evolution of cooperation. 
 
Multilevel selection and the evolution of cooperation 
This chapter has focused on an “inclusive fitness” approach to understanding 
cooperative evolution (Hamilton, 1964; West et al., 2007). An alternative 
conceptualization to understanding the evolution of cooperation is through “multilevel 
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selection” (MLS; Hamilton, 1975; Sober & Wilson, 1998). MLS decomposes fitness 
into a “between-group” component and a “within-group” component (if the population 
is not structured into groups, then the between-group component is absent). 
Selection favors selfish behavior within groups (because altruists have lower fitness 
than selfish types within groups), while selection favors altruistic behavior between 
groups (because groups with altruists have greater fitness than groups with fewer or 
no altruists). If between-group selection outweighs within-group selection, then 
seemingly altruistic behavior can spread through the population. 
However, there are two important points to note here. Firstly, MLS models are 
mathematically equivalent to inclusive fitness models; the only difference is how they 
decompose fitness. MLS decomposes fitness into within-group and between-group 
components, while inclusive fitness decomposes fitness into direct and indirect 
fitness components. From an inclusive fitness perspective, the consequences of 
between-group interactions are part of an individual’s inclusive fitness. Secondly, the 
MLS definition of altruism is different to the inclusive fitness definition of altruism. 
Altruism in an MLS framework is a behavior which lowers an individual’s fitness 
within a group, regardless of the between-group benefits to cooperation (Sober and 
Wilson 1998). Altruism from an inclusive fitness perspective, as described above, is 
a behavior which decreases an individual’s direct fitness, so can only evolve if 
cooperation increases an individual’s indirect fitness (Hamilton, 1964; West et al., 
2007). It is important not to confuse the two: behavior may be altruistic from an MLS 
perspective, but not altruistic from an inclusive fitness perspective. 
An example may make these points a little less abstract. Take between-group 
conflict. Imagine two groups in conflict over a limited resource (land, say), and 
individuals in each group can either cooperate (help in the conflict at a cost to self, 
28 
 
relative to group-mates) or defect (not participate, so pay no cost, but reap the 
rewards of their group-mates’ cooperation). From an MLS perspective, cooperative 
individuals obviously have lower fitness than selfish individuals within groups, so this 
behavior is altruistic (as defined by MLS). However, groups with more cooperators 
are more successful in between-group conflict, so cooperative behavior may spread 
in the population if the strength of between-group selection is great enough. 
From an inclusive fitness perspective, however, if groups are composed of kin, then 
this cooperative behavior can be understood in terms of individuals maximizing their 
inclusive fitness by increasing their indirect fitness, even at a cost to their direct 
fitness. This behavior is therefore still altruistic, but this time from an inclusive fitness 
perspective. Alternatively, if groups are not composed of kin, then this cooperative 
behavior can still be understood from an inclusive fitness standpoint as individual 
fitness also depends on group fitness (i.e., individuals from cooperative groups have 
greater fitness than individuals from less cooperative groups). Cooperative 
individuals may therefore increase their direct fitness by being part of a cooperative 
and successful group, even if said group contains some defectors who have even 
greater fitness than themselves. This behavior would therefore be altruistic from an 
MLS perspective, but not altruistic from an inclusive fitness perspective. 
Each of the processes described above as solutions to the PD – repeated 
interactions, kin selection, and cooperative assortativity – can be described in a 
multilevel, as opposed to an inclusive fitness, framework (Sober & Wilson, 1998). In 
each case, groups of cooperators propagate, even though individual cooperators 
have lower fitness than defectors within groups. However, it is essential to remember 
that MLS is not an alternative process to inclusive fitness, but rather is simply a 
different perspective on the evolutionary process and an alternative way of doing the 
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math. The perspective one chooses to adopt will depend on the specifics of the 
system being studied: if groups act predominantly as unified wholes (such as whole 
organisms or, potentially, eusocial insect colonies), then an MLS perspective may be 
fruitful; if populations are not structured, then an inclusive fitness approach will be 
more appropriate; for cases in-between – where populations are structured into 
groups, but these groups do not act as unified wholes (such as human groups) – 
then it may be a matter of personal preference which perspective to adopt. 
 
Limitations of the PD for understanding cooperation 
While the PD has undoubtedly been a valuable tool for understanding the evolution 
of cooperation, it does possess some limitations. Firstly, not all cooperative behavior 
can be modelled as a PD. As discussed above, many cooperative situations 
resemble coordination game scenarios (figure 4), which do not suffer from the free-
rider problem but rather suffer from problems of coordination. An alternative 
scenario, although still a social dilemma, is known as the ‘snowdrift game’. Imagine a 
situation where two drivers are stuck behind a snowdrift; as with the Prisoner’s 
Dilemma, individuals can either cooperate (dig through the snowdrift) or defect (not 
dig). While joint cooperation would mean clearing the snow faster, defecting and 
letting the other dig would be a superior strategy as no energy would be expended. 
However, in this case being the ‘sucker’ (the individual who cooperates while the 
other defects) is superior to mutual defection, as they still benefit by clearing the 
snow and getting home. The pay-off structure for this scenario is therefore T>R>S>P 
(figure 5). In the snowdrift game defection is not the optimal strategy in one-shot 
interactions, resulting in a mixed population of cooperators and defectors (Doebeli & 
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Hauert, 2005). Accordingly, experimental findings have indicated that levels of 
cooperation are greater in an iterated snowdrift game compared to an iterated PD 
game (Kümmerli et al., 2007). Note also that this game is formally identical to the 
‘Hawk-Dove’ game (Maynard Smith, 1982) or to the common childhood game of 
‘chicken’ (where the first to ‘blink’ – or  ‘chicken out’ – is the cooperator).  
When ‘cooperating’ in this snowdrift game situation the benefit to the partner may be 
incidental, meaning that behavior in these situations may not be strictly cooperative, 
but rather reflects self-interest (Clutton-Brock, 2009; West et al., 2007). That is, 
players cooperate (dig through the snowdrift) in order to get themselves home 
because that is preferable to being stuck behind the snowdrift; the benefit to the 
other player is wholly incidental. Although cooperation in this scenario benefits 
others, it did not evolve to do so as the effect on the other player is an unintended 
by-product. The snowdrift game appears to characterize several real-world 
circumstances, particularly regarding producer-scrounger dynamics. In these 
situations, some organisms produce resources, such as food, information or cultural 
knowledge, which is then appropriated – or ‘scrounged’ – by others in the group. To 
take a foraging example, while neither party may wish to forage and have food taken 
by others, the costs to not foraging are greater for some individuals. These 
individuals would therefore ‘blink’ first in this game of chicken. For instance, compare 
an individual with multiple dependent offspring against another individual with no 
dependents. In this scenario the second childless individual has less need to forage 
compared to the first as the costs to not foraging for the individual with multiple 
children are larger as their household is in greater need of resources. Consistent 
with this idea, men from Ifaluk atoll with more dependent offspring were more likely 
to fish compared to those with few dependents, as the costs to not foraging were 
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greater for those with many mouths to feed (Sosis, Feldstein, & Hill, 1998). These 
alternative pay-off structures have been under-researched compared to Prisoner’s 
Dilemma scenarios, despite their seeming applicability to several kinds of social 
interactions among a number of taxa (Alvard & Nolin, 2002; Clutton-Brock, 2009; 
Doebeli & Hauert, 2005). 
 
Figure 5: The pay-off matrix for a snowdrift scenario. As with the Prisoner’s 
Dilemma (figure 2), the Temptation pay-off is superior to mutual cooperation 
(Reward). However, in contrast to the Prisoner’s Dilemma, mutual defection 
(Punishment) is inferior to being the Sucker. The ranking of these outcomes 
for a snowdrift scenario (from best to worst, in terms of pay-offs) are: 
T>R>S>P. The pay-offs for player A are shown in the top right of each cell 
(above the diagonal), while the pay-offs for player B are shown in the bottom 
left (below the diagonal).  
 
In addition to their theoretical utility, the PD and associated games, such as the 
Public Goods Game, Ultimatum Game and Dictator Game, have been used 
extensively in experimental settings to empirically assess behavior in social dilemma 
scenarios (Camerer, 2003). Although these experimental protocols offer conceptual 
simplicity and clarity, in practice there are many difficulties in interpreting behavior in 
these games. Foremost among these are concerns over the ecological validity and 
interpretation of such experimental results. Taking issues of external validity first, it is 
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often not clear how, or even whether, behavior in these games reflects real-world 
cooperation. In these experimental games initial levels of cooperation are generally 
quite high; in Public Goods Games players tend to share half of their endowment, 
while in Dictator Game situations (where individuals simply share some proportion of 
resources with an unknown recipient) individuals still often offer around 20% of the 
stake, despite no threat of punishment or future interactions (Camerer, 2003). 
However, in the real-world such cooperative behavior is generally not observed; a 
recent field study based in Las Vegas found that individuals given a windfall of 
resources (casino chips) at a bus stop shared none of the chips with another 
individual waiting nearby, even after being instructed that they could share them with 
the other person if they wanted (Winking & Mizer, 2013). Additionally, there are 
difficulties concerning whether behavior in these experimental games reflects a 
single, stable, cooperative construct. For instance, it is not clear whether cooperation 
is a unitary phenomenon – and therefore stable from one context to the next – or 
whether it is more context-dependent – in which case experimental cooperation may 
not reflect real-world cooperation or cooperation in a different experimental game. 
Although some studies have attempted to overcome these criticisms, by 
demonstrating that game behavior predicts real-world cooperation and that 
cooperation in one context predicts cooperation in a different context (e.g., 
Peysakhovich, Nowak, & Rand, 2014), interpretation over the validity of these games 







The PD has been widely used as a theoretical and empirical tool to explore the 
circumstances under which cooperation is likely to evolve. As of August 2018, a 
Scopus search for the term 'Prisoner’s Dilemma' in titles, abstracts and keywords 
returned over 5,000 articles. It is likely that this fascination with this seemingly simple 
yet beguiling game will continue for years to come, offering insights into why humans 
and other animals both cooperate extensively with each other yet simultaneously aim 
to exploit one another when possible. The PD is an intuitive and fundamental insight 
into social behavior and the conflict between selfish and cooperative strategies; the 
dilemma is unlikely to be solved any time soon. 
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